03

Financial Markets & Money

The Money Multiplier

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The money multiplier links central-bank money (monetary base H = currency + reserves) to the broader money supply M = currency + deposits. With reserve ratio θ and currency ratio c, M = mm · H where mm = 1 / [c + θ(1−c)]. If c=0 (no currency), mm = 1/θ.

Derivation

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Multiplier mm
5.00
Money supply M
$1,000
Deposits D
$1,000
Currency CU
$0
Lending rounds (first 6)
#DepositReserves (θ)Loan out (1−θ)
1$200$40$160
2$160$32$128
3$128$25.6$102.4
4$102.4$20.48$81.92
5$81.92$16.38$65.54
6$65.54$13.11$52.43
Formula: M = H / [c + θ(1−c)] = $200 / 0.200 = $1,000
Inputs
Base money H$200
Reserve ratio θ0.20
Currency ratio c0.00

Mechanics: each $1 of H → $1/θ of M when c = 0.

Breakdown: high c (cash hoarding) or high θ (tight reserves) shrinks mm.

Modern LM: CB targets i, so M is endogenous — this widget shows the mechanics, not the policy instrument.

Definitions

| Symbol | Meaning | |--------|---------| | MM | Money supply (currency + deposits) | | HH | Monetary base / CB money (currency + reserves) | | CUCU | Currency held by public | | DD | Bank deposits | | RR | Reserves held at the central bank | | c=CU/Mc = CU/M | Currency ratio (behavioural) | | θ=R/D\theta = R/D | Reserve ratio (regulatory + prudential) |

The Formula

M=1c+θ(1c)HM = \frac{1}{c + \theta(1-c)} \cdot H

In the no-currency case (c=0c = 0):

M=1θHM = \frac{1}{\theta} \cdot H

The Lending Process (c = 0, θ = 0.2)

CB buys 200ofbonds200 of bonds → 200 injected into the banking system → geometric lending expansion: the sum of the series is ΔM = ΔH / θ = $1000.

| Round | Deposit | Reserves | Loan out | |-------|---------|----------|----------| | 1 | 200200 | 40 | 1602160 | | 2 | 160 | 3232 | 128 | | 3 | 128128 | 25.60 | 102.40Total102.40 | | … | … | … | … | | Total | **1,000** | $200 | — |

Why the Multiplier Can Break Down

  • Excess reserves: Banks hold more than required θ when confidence is low (2008–15 QE era). Effective multiplier collapses.
  • Currency hoarding: c rises in crises → mm falls.
  • ZLB: At zero interest, the opportunity cost of holding reserves is zero → banks prefer reserves over lending.

Policy Implications

  • Open-market purchase (CB buys bonds): HM\uparrow H \Rightarrow \uparrow M by mmΔHmm \cdot \Delta H.
  • Reserve requirement cut (lower θ\theta): mmmm rises → same HH supports more MM.
  • Modern flat-LM view: CB targets the interest rate directly, so MM is endogenous. Multiplier describes the mechanics, but the instrument is iTi^T, not HH.

Worked Example

θ = 0.2, c = 0. CB purchases $200 of bonds from an individual.

  1. Round 1: Seller deposits $200. Bank keeps $40, lends $160.
  2. Round 2: Borrower deposits $160. Bank keeps $32, lends $128.
  3. Round 3: Deposit $128. Bank keeps $25.60, lends $102.40.
  4. Geometric series: ΔM = $200 × [1 + 0.8 + 0.8² + …] = $200 × (1/0.2) = $1,000.
ΔM = $1,000. Multiplier = 1/0.2 = 5. $200 of base money → $1,000 of money supply.

Common Mistakes

  • Forgetting currency: with c > 0, mm = 1/[c + θ(1−c)], not 1/θ.
  • Confusing M (money supply) with H (monetary base): CB controls H, not M.
  • Thinking mm is fixed — it changes with c (payment habits) and θ (regulation/behaviour).
  • Ignoring excess reserves: banks may hold > θ when confidence is low, shrinking effective mm.

Exam Cues

  • No-currency case: mm = 1/θ. Learn by heart.
  • Full formula: mm = 1/[c + θ(1−c)]. Verify with c=0 → 1/θ.
  • Geometric series: 1 + (1−θ) + (1−θ)² + … = 1/θ.
  • Policy: ΔM = mm × ΔH. Tightening: ↓H → ↓M by mm × ΔH.

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